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By Milton R. Larson*
Free Press v. Fair Trial in Nebraska:
A Position Paper
"[T] he right of courts to conduct their business in an untrammeled way
lies at the foundation of our system of govermen...
I. INTRODUCTION
A constitutional conflict vitally affecting the press and the legal
profession began with the brutal slaying of three children and three
adults in the village of Sutherland, Nebraska, on October 18, 1975.
The United States Supreme Court, in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stu-
art,2 faced the conflict between the constitutional guarantee of a
free press and a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial before an
impartial jury. The high Court determined that by imposing a ju-
dicial restraint on media coverage of the Sutherland slaying, a Ne-
braska district court judge had violated the first amendment rights
of members of the news media. This article will explain why the
judicial restraint was issued and will explore the problems facing
a prosecutor in a sensational trial.
The issue of judicial restraint was raised in the Sheppard3 case,
decided ten years ago. There, pervasive publicity, both pretrial and
contemporaneous with trial, together with the "carnival atmos-
phere" surrounding the proceedings resulted in the chastisement of
the legal profession and the news media. Since then prosecutors
have increasingly feared reversal from unduly prejudicial publicity,
and publishers and broadcasters have increasingly tasted the bitter
cup of restraint upon publication and dissemination of news con-
cerning pending criminal actions. This atmosphere has created an
unhappy deterioration of the relationship between the news media
* Lincoln County Attorney, North Platte, Nebraska. Private Practice,
1972-74, Associate County Judge, 1974-75. B-. 1970, Hastings College,
Hastings, Nebraska; J.D. 1972, University of Nebraska.
Larson was assisted by John P. Murphy, Deputy Lincoln County
Attorney, North Platte, Nebraska. A.B. 1969, St. Louis University, St.
Louis, Missouri; J.D. 1974, Creighton University.
1. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 383 (1962).
2. 96 S. Ct. 2791 (1976).
3. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
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and the judicial system. Each distrusts the motives of the other.
The court system seems to suspect that the news media's only con-
cerns are for sales and ratings. The media, on the other hand, sus-
pect the judicial system of conspiring to keep its own inadequacies
from being made public. This mutual paranoia strikes at the very
heart of the democratic principles upon which our Constitution is
based.
Fairness to the rivals in this controversy demands recognition
that conscientious efforts have been made through joint coopera-
tion between responsible representatives of the news media and the
judiciary to obviate any conflict between the first and sixth amend-
ments of the Constitution. One result was the American Bar Asso-
ciation Reardon report of 1968, 4 which established guidelines for at-
torneys dealing with the press during criminal justice proceedings.
In 1970, Nebraska adopted its own voluntary guidelines5 through
agreement among judges, attorneys, and newsmen. These guide-
lines list material generally acceptable and unacceptable in the re-
porting of pending criminal actions. The agreement states that it
is normally inappropriate to reveal a suspect's prior criminal record
or the existence or contents of any alleged confession and that
there should be no offer of any opinion about the guilt or character 6
of a criminal defendant or the outcome of his trial.
4. ABA ADvisoRY COMM. ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESs, STANDARDS RE-
LATING To FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PREss (1968).
5. See Nebraska Bar-Press Guidelines for Disclosure and Reporting of In-
formation Relating to Imminent or Pending Criminal Litigation, June,
1970, in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 2829 (1976).
6. An article captioned "Simants described as 'quiet one of the family'"
appeared in the North Platte Telegraph, on October 20, 1975, and
stated as follows:
Erwin Charles (Herb) Simants was described by a relative
today as "the quiet one of the family" who found it difficult
as a child to show emotion and who hardly learned to read
or write because he frequently missed school while growing
up in North Platte.
Simants and his older brother, James, 38, who died in jail
two years ago after being treated for a beating received on
a North Platte street while apparently intoxicated, were "out-
siders in the family," according to a relative who asked not
to be named.
"They weren't accepted in the family at all," the relative
said. "They were always in trouble so we weren't allowed
to run around with them."
"Herb could never show emotion . . . he held it in," ac-
cording to the relative.
Simants had once been married and he and his wife had
a child who died after being born with a congenital birth de-
fect. He and his wife later separated, the relative said.
A Sutherland resident, Mrs. Laura Woodard, who lives a
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However, editors' concern that they and not judges should deter-
mine the newsworthiness of events and the extent of dissemination
to the public has continually been met with equally great concern
from the judiciary that judges and not editors should be armed with
the power to control judicial proceedings in a manner that insures
due process of law. This conflict has resulted in restrictions on
press coverage of judicial proceedings at an increasing rate. These
orders are sometimes disobeyed, even on pain of contempt.
Ironically, it is the very guidelines entered into upon a voluntary
basis which provided much of the impetus for Nebraska Press Ass'n
v. Stuart. On Monday, October 20, 1975, the local newspaper of
general circulation throughout Lincoln County and surrounding
counties published on its first page, dedicated almost exclusively
to coverage of the gruesome weekend events, the following ex-
cerpts:
... Standing near the Kellie home Saturday night, the elder
Simants tearfully said, "My son killed five or six people here,"...
The elder Simants said his son told him of the slayings, Linstrom
said. But when his father suggested that he turn himself in,
Erwin fled, according to Linstrom...
Further reported in the same article were the following remarks
of the Lincoln County Sheriff:
S.. Gilster said Simants told him that he went to both the
Rodeo and Longhorn bars in Sutherland after the shootings oc-
curred and ordered a beer in each. "The patrons didn't know
anything about it (the shootings) at that time," Gilster said.
Gilster said Simants later "wandered in the weeds near the scene
of the crime."7
Additional articles on page one of the paper indicated that the eld-
est victim, Henery Kellie, had recently saved the defendant, Si-
mants, from jail by paying a fine for public intoxication which the
defendant was unable to pay.8 On the same day the Lincoln Star,9
short distance from the murder house, described Simants as
a loner.
"We don't know him very well, I don't think he ever
mixed with other folks," she said.
Art Minshull, a tavern owner, also said Simants was "kind
of a loner type."
And Albert Meyen, who lived just a block from Simants
before the night of terror erupted in the village, said of the
suspect: "I didn't even know he existed."
North Platte Telegraph, Oct. 20, 1975, at 1, col. 2.
7. Id. at 1, cols. 4-6.
8. The article was captioned "Kellie paid Simants' fine," and reported
as follows:
Henery Kellie saved Erwin Charles Simants from jail Sept.
29, according to friends of Kellie.
According to the friends, Simants had been fined $50 for
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a paper of limited circulation in Lincoln County carried a story re-
lating Simants' confession to his father. The following day, a Den-
ver paper,10 also of limited circulation in Lincoln County and sur-
rounding counties, reported confessions the defendant had made to
his mother.
The Omaha bureau of the Associated Press released a wire story
on October 21, 1975, stating that the Lincoln County Attorney had
advised newsmen that Simants had given authorities a statement.
The bureau chief later admitted that no such statement had been
made."
All these articles appeared in the wake of the tragic event. Dur-
ing the eleven hours from discovery of the crime to the arrest of
a suspect numerous reporters and photographers were at the crime
scene, understandably attempting to obtain as much information as
public intoxication but was unable to pay the fine. The Rev.
Nels Ibsen, Kellie's pastor, said Kellie paid the fine "so he
(Simants) didn't have to lay it out in jail."
"Henery was well liked and it was just his nature to help
people," said the minister. "I don't know if he had ever paid
anyone's fine before, but he'd shelled out money to help in
other ways."
Kellie, Pastor Ibsen said, had befriended Simants while he
stayed with Simants' sister, Mrs. William Boggs, next door to
the Kellie residence.
Id. at 1, col. 6.
9. The Lincoln Star, Oct. 20, 1975, at 1, cols. 2-5.
10. The Denver Post, on October 21, 1975, stated on the front page,
"Charges Filed in Nebraska Family Deaths," . . . "Simants' mother
said her son admitted the killings to her and her husband, but police
-baffled by the incident-wouldn't reveal whether they had a confes-
sion."
11. See Friendly, A Crime and Its Aftershock, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1976,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 16, 86:
By 9 that morning [October 19, 1975], Simants had been
booked, stripped of his clothing and boots, which would be
used as evidence, and had listened three times to the "Miranda
card" warning that statements he might make could be used
against him. Now he was making a confession in which he
admitted to the murders and sexual assaults....
This confession was not officially reported to the media,
but 30 minutes earlier, prosecutor Larson was quoted by the
A.P. as saying, "Simants apparently walked to his father's
home after the shooting and told his father he was responsible
for the deaths." However, the A.P. now says it erred in quot-
ing Larson. Ed Nichols, A.P. bureau chief in Omaha, admits
hearsay of the ambulance driver's husband was falsely at-
tributed to Larson.
The Lincoln Star, Oct. 21, 1975, at 8, cols. 3-4, stated:
Police have yet to reveal any known motive for the slay-
ings, but Lincoln County Atty. Milton Larson said Monday,
that Simants has given authoritites [sic] a statement. Larson
declined to reveal any of the contents of the statement.
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possible. Some were demanding access to the scene of the crime
itself.12 In addition, a helicopter owned or hired by NBC News ar-
rived at the crime scene from Denver, Colorado, during the early
morning hours of October 19, 1975, before the criminal investigation
had been completed and the bodies removed from the premises.
Telephone calls from the three major com mercial television net-
works, various national news services, and many major news publi-
cations, international and national in scope, were received by the
prosecution throughout the night and for several days following the
incident.
In this atmosphere the prosecution decided to request an order
restricting pretrial publication of prejudicial facts. The step was
taken in an effort to insure the impaneling of a constitutionally ac-
ceptable jury.13 The corollary to a criminal defendant's right to
a fair trial is the right of society to effective enforcement of it's
penal code.
The State's motion was filed late in the afternoon of October
21, 1975, with an oral request for immediate hearing. The urgency
was apparent because a preliminary hearing was scheduled for the
following morning.1 4
Ronald A. Ruff, Lincoln County Judge, immediately notified in-
terested media personnel' 5 and set a hearing for seven o'clock the
same evening. The news media were represented by counsel at the
hearing. No record was made, but statements of counsel were
heard. The prosecution advised the court that testimony in the na-
ture of confessions by defendant to his thirteen year old nephew,
to his parents, and to law enforcement officials would be offered
at the preliminary hearing. Further, the testimony of a pathologist
would reveal that one of the child victims had been raped both be-
fore and after she was killed.16 Concern was expressed that publi-
12. Media personnel on the scene by 11:30 p.m., October 18, 1975, included
representatives of the Omaha World Herald Company, North Platte
Broadcasting Company, Associated Press and United Press Interna-
national
13. See Motion for Restrictive Order, filed Oct. 21, 1975, State v. Simants,
Case No. 75-789 (Lincoln County Ct., Neb. 1975).
14. It should be noted that a continuance was unavailable to the State
in light of NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-501 (Reissue 1964), which requires that
a criminal defendant who is unable to make bond or is held without
bond be offered a preliminary hearing within four days of his arrest.
The defendant, Erwin Charles Simants, was held without bond.
15. Representatives of the Nebraska Press Association, the World Herald
Company, the General Star, Western Publishing Company, North
Platte Broadcasting, Nebraska Broadcasters Association, Associated
Press, and U.P.I. were notified by telephone.
16. For Nebraska statutes dealing with sexual assault see NEB. REv. STAT.
§§ 28-408.01 to 28-408.05 (Reissue 1975).
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cation of such testimony would be so prejudicial as to preclude
the impaneling of a constitutionally acceptable jury. Defense coun-
sel joined in the motion. The court rejected arguments of counsel
for the media that any such order would be unconstitutional and
entered a protective order 17 the following morning, just prior to
the preliminary hearing. This order precluded the "release for pub-
lic dissemination in any form or manner whatsoever any testimony
given or evidence adduced during the preliminary hearing." The
order further precluded the dissemination of any information re-
garding proceedings apart from the preliminary hearing other than
as set forth in the Nebraska Bar-Press Guidelines for Disclosure
and Reporting of Information Relating to Imminent or Pending
Criminal Litigation.'8  That part of the order, in effect, made
compulsory these formerly voluntary guidelines.
On October 23, a hearing was held before Judge Hugh Stuart
in the Lincoln County District Court. The constitutionality of the
county court order was challenged and evidence was presented by
all parties. The matter was taken under advisement by the court
and observations of counsel were requested. Four days later, the
court terminated the county court's order and directed that pretrial
publicity in this action should be governed by the Nebraska Bar-
Press Guidelines. Those guidelines were adopted by the district
court and incorporated into its order.'9
The news media appealed, first to the Nebraska Supreme Court
and then to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, in his capacity as Justice
for the Eighth Circuit.20  They complained that the Bar-Press
17. Order of the Court dated Oct. 22, 1975, State v. Simants, Case No. 75-
789 (Lincoln County Ct., Neb. 1975).
18. The issuing judge, Ronald A. Ruff, indicated to counsel that he recog-
nized the overbreadth of the order, but that in light of the urgency
of the situation, his lack of knowledge regarding the scope of the testi-
mony to be introduced at the preliminary hearing, and the opportunity
for immediate review of the order by the district court following bind
over, the order was appropriate.
19. See Order of the Court dated Oct. 27, 1975, State v. Simants, Case No.
B-2904 (Lincoln County Dist. Ct., Neb. 1975).
20. Justice Blackmun stated in his November 20, 1975, opinion in part as
follows:
The most troublesome aspect of the District Court's restric-
tive order is its wholesale incorporation of the Nebraska Bar-
Press Guidelines for Disclosure and Reporting of Information
Relating to Imminent or Pending Criminal Litigation. With-
out rehearsing the description of those guidelines set forth in
my prior opinion, it is evident that they comprise a "voluntary
code" which was not intended to be mandatory. Indeed the
word "guidelines" itself so indicates. They are merely sug-
gestive and, accordingly, are necessarily vague. To cite only
one example, they state that the publication of an accused's
criminal record "should be considered very carefully" and
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Guidelines were voluntary in nature, never having been intended
to be incorporated in a formal court order, and that any judicial
order in the nature of a prior restraint .was constitutionally defec-
tive as violative of the first amendment guarantee of a free press.
Justice Blackmun agreed with the press regarding the wholesale
incorporation of the guidelines, and on November 20, remanded ju-
risdiction to the Nebraska Supreme Court for further -proceedings.
However, Justice Blackmun did conclude that some prior restraints
on pretrial publicity were permissible and refused to stay the en-
tire order. He concluded that facts strongly implicative of an ac-
cused's guilt may be restrained from publication prior to trial. "A
confession or statement against interest is the paradigm," he said.2"
He enumerated several examples of strongly implicative facts which
may, under some circumstances, be restrained for pretrial pur-
poses. Justice Blackman further observed that the accused's crim-
inal record, though not necessarily implicative, may in some in-
stances be highly prejudicial if released prior to trial.22
The Nebraska Supreme Court heard oral arguments on Novem-
ber 25, and issued an order in compliance with Justice Blackmun's
ruling on December 1.23 Applying Justice Blackmun's reasoning to
"should generally be avoided." These phrases do not provide
the substance of a permissible court order in the First Amend-
ment area. If a member of the press is to go to jail for re-
porting news in violation of a court order, it is essential that
he disobey a more definite and precise command than one that
he consider his act "very carefully." Other parts of the in-
corporated Guidelines are less vague and indefinite. I find
them on the whole, however, sufficiently riddled with vague
and indefinite admonitions-understandably so in view of the
basic nature of "guidelines"-that I have concluded that the
best and momentary course is to stay their mandatory and
wholesale imposition in the present context. The state courts,
nonetheless, are free forthwith to reimpose particular provi-
sions included in the Guidelines so long as they are deemed
pertinent to the facts of this particular case and so long as
they are adequately specific and in keeping with the re-
mainder of this order. That portion of the restrictive order
that generally incorporates the Guidelines is hereby stayed.
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 96 S. Ct. 251, 254-55 (Blackmun, Cir-
cuit Justice, 1975).
21. Id. at 255.
22. Counsel for the media took issue with the prohibition contained in the
district court order precluding disclosure of the "exact nature of the
limitations" that it imposed upon publicity. Mr. Justice Blacknun, in
answering this contention, said:
Inasmuch as there is no point in prohibiting the reporting of
a confession if it may be reported that one has been made
but may not be spoken of, the provision ... that the restric-
tion on reporting confessions may itself not be disclosed is not
stayed.
Id. at 256.
23. See State v. Simants, 194 Neb. 783, 236 N.W.2d 794 (1975).
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the facts before it, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the only
pretrial restrictions on publication would be allegations of the exist-
ence or contents of: (1) confessions or admissions against interest
made by the accused to law enforcement officials; (2) confessions
or admissions against interest, oral or written, made by the accused
to third parties, with the exception of statements made by the ac-
cused to representatives of the news media; or (3) other informa-
tion strongly implicative of the accused as the perpetrator of the
slayings.
II. ISSUE
The issue is narrow. There is an overwhelming presumption
against prior restraints on publication and broadcast.24 There is
no suggestion that the full context of judicial proceedings should
not ultimately be made available to the public. The issue does not
affect the vast majority of criminal cases, for generally the first
amendment right of a free press and the sixth amendment right
to a fair trial by an impartial jury enjoy a harmonious relationship.
Rather, at issue is whether, in the exceptional case, the sensa-
tional, highly publicized case, locale and circumstance can combine
to create an atmosphere in which the fair and orderly administra-
tion of justice is impossible.
Let us presume that such a situation may arise. A trial judge
should then, in the absence of reasonable alternatives, be permitted
to balance the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press
against a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial
jury free from outside influence. On finding the existence of a
"clear and present danger" to the administration of criminal justice,
proper judicial discretion requires issuance of an order tailored to
the circumstances momentarily and narrowly proscribing prejudi-
cial pre-trial publicity.
There appears to be an undercurrent that perhaps the ultimate
question presented is the integrity of the jury system. It is sug-
gested that for the first time in modem history the judicial system
is directly questioning the ability of potential jurors to set aside
information obtained prior to trial, which may render them unable
to base their verdict solely upon the evidence received at the time
of the trial. It strains credulity to suggest that ordinary citizens,
once elevated to the status of juror, somehow acquire a super-hu-
man capacity to set aside preconceived prejudices. A general tenet
of education is that one learns from what he sees, from what he
reads, and from what he hears. Further, an idea, once implanted
24. See Times-Picayune Publishing Corp. v. Schulingkamp, 419 U.S. 1301
(1974).
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in the mind may become permanent and have a lasting effect upon
the individual. It has been observed that the "influence that lurks
in an opinion, once formed is so persistent that it unconsciously
fights detachment from the mental process of the average man.125
Recently, experiments were conducted at Columbia University
by Professors Padawer-Singer and Barton to determine the impact
on potential jurors of prior knowledge of alleged retracted confes-
sions and previous criminal record of a criminal defendant. The
prior knowledge was communicated to the jurors through news
stories regarding a major criminal case. The results establishea
that newspaper stories containing such information had a definite
impact on experimental juries. Although not all unfavorable pub-
licity was apparently damaging, a serious problem was shown to
exist in regard to a previous criminal record or alleged retracted
confession.2 6
The question of pretrial restraint in limited, highly prejudicial
areas involving due process considerations does not constitute an
affront to juror integrity. Rather it is only an observation of the
reality of human frailty. Recognition of this unalterable fact pro-
vides much of the unspoken but well reasoned basis for several
holdings, commencing with Irvin v. Dowd2T which marked the first
state court conviction reversed solely on the ground of prejudicial
pretrial publicity.28 In Irvin, the Supreme Court unanimously
held that a prisoner had been denied due process of law under the
fourteenth amendment because the jury in the state trial had not
been impartial. Irvin involved a conviction of murder resulting in
the imposition of the death penalty. Pretrial headlines proclaimed
that the defendant had confessed to six murders and twenty-four
burglaries for which he was not charged. Of 430 veniremen called,
nearly 90% entertained some opinion as to the guilt of the defend-
ant. Eight of the twelve jurors themselves thought the defendant
to be guilty. A virtual flood of newspaper headlines, articles, car-
toons, and pictures was unleashed against the defendant during
the seven months preceding his trial. The Court did state that the
25. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727 (1961).
26. R. SIMoN, THE JURY SYSTE IN Aiwv cA 125 (1975).
27. 366U.S. 717 (1961).
28. In Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959), a conviction was
reversed when jurors were exposed, through news accounts, to infor-
mation not admitted at trial where the conviction was for unlawful
dispensing of drugs, and where the State alleged that the defendant
had previously practiced medicine without a license. Some of the
jurors had seen the news accounts. Although the reversal was made
on supervisoifr rather than constitutional grounds, this case marks the
Court's first recognition of the effect of prejudicial pretrial publicity.
The case was expressly held not applicable to state court proceedings.
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mere existence of any preconceived notion as to guilt or innocence,
without more, will not raise a presumption against a prospective
juror's impartiality, provided the juror can lay aside his opinion and
render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented in court.29
No fault can be found in this rationale. Nevertheless, the Court
held that in this case due process considerations required reversal
of the conviction 0 Justice Clark observed that notwithstanding
assertions of prospective jurors that they could be fair and impar-
tial, "where so many, so many times, admitted prejudice, such a
statement of impartiality can be given little weight."'3 1 Justice
Frankfurter in his concurring opinion intimated that the fair ad-
ministration of criminal justice is the ultimate consideration. 2
In Estes v. Texas33 Justice Clark, again writing for the majority
of the court, related the "carnival atmosphere" surrounding the
coverage of the now famous swindling case involving financier Billy
Sol Estes. The trial court had permitted pretrial hearings to be
aired. However, at the trial itself, with the exception of arguments
of counsel,34 live coverage was prohibited. Booths were built in
the rear of the courtroom for cameras in an effort to minimize the
effect of their presence, but the cameras were clearly visible. The
Court ruled that the sixth amendment was violated by federal
courts and the fourteenth amendment by state courts when they
allowed criminal trials to be televised to the public.
29. 366 U.S. at 723.
30. Where one's life is at stake-and accounting for the frailties
of human nature-we can only say that in light of the circum-
stances here the finding of impartiality does not meet consti-
tutional standards. Two-thirds of the jurors had an opinion
that petitioner was guilty and were familiar with the material
facts and circumstances involved, including the fact that other
murders were attributed to him, some going so far as to say
that it would take evidence to overcome their belief .... With
his life at stake, it is not requiring too much that petitioner
be tried in an atmosphere undisturbed by so huge a wave of
public passion and by a jury other than one in which two-
thirds of its members admit, before hearing any testimony,
to possessing a belief in his guilt.
Id. at 727-28.
31. Id. at 728.
32. This Court has not yet decided that the fair administration of
criminal justice must be subordinated to another safeguard
of our constitutional system-freedom of the press, properly
conceived. The Court has not yet decided that, while convic-
tions must be reversed and miscarriages of justice result
because the minds of the jurors or potential jurors were
poisoned, the poisoner is constitutionally protected in plying
his trade.
Id. at 730.
33. 381U.S. 532 (1965).
34. Only the prosecution arguments were aired as the defense requested
not to be broadcast. Id. at 537.
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Justice Harlan concurred in the Court's opinion but noted that
the case dealt with a criminal trial of great notoriety and not with
one of a more routine nature. There had been such extensive pre-
trial publicity that press clippings which were on file with the
Court filled eleven volumes. This publicity had given the case na-
tional notoriety. A two-day pretrial hearing had been televised
in an atmosphere which lacked the judicial serenity and calm re-
quired for the fair administration of justice.
The Court recognized that pretrial publicity may be more harm-
ful than publicity during the trial, for it may well set community
opinion as to guilt or innocence.35 Four of the trial jurors selected
had seen or heard all or part of the broadcast of the earlier pro-
ceedings.
A free press was recognized as a mighty catalyst in awakening
public interest in governmental affairs, exposing governmental cor-
ruption and informing the populace of public events and occur-
rences, including court proceedings. While this important function
must be protected, the Court clearly recognized that the exercise
of a free press must necessarily be subject to the maintenance of
absolute fairness in the judicial process of a democratic society.36
The concept that reporters of all media are free to report
whatever occurs in open court was reaffirmed in Estes. This con-
cept will be discussed later in the context of the principal case.
3 7
The theory that actual prejudice must be shown by the moving
party prior to the entry of an order restricting publicity was re-
butted in Estes.38  The Court held essentially that circumstances
such as those in Estes create a probability of prejudice that is
deemed inherently lacking in due process.39
35. 381 U.S. at 536.
36. Id. at 539.
37. It is true that the public has the right to be informed as to
what occurs in its courts, but reporters of all media, including
television, are always present if they wish to be and are
plainly free to report whatever occurs in open court through
their respective media. This was settled in Bridges v. Cali-fornia, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), and Pennekamp v. Florida, 328
U.S. 331 (1946), which we reaffirm.
Id. at 541-542.
38. Cf. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 281 (1942).
39. [T]his Court itself has found instances in which a showing
of actual prejudice is not a prerequisite to reversal. This is
such a case. It is true that in most case- involving claims
of due process deprivations we require a showing of identifi-
able prejudice to the accused. Nevertheless, at times a pro-
cedure employed by the State involves such a probability that
prejudice will result that it is deemed inherently lacking in
due process.
381 U.S. at 542.
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It long has been established that the integrity of our judicial
system requires that verdicts be based only on evidence adduced
and arguments made in open court and not on any outside influ-
ence, whether private talk or public print.40 In Rideau v. Louisi-
ana4 1 and again in Turner v. Louisiana,42 the Supreme Court de-
parted from the approach taken in Irvin where a careful examina-
tion was made of the facts to determine whether actual prejudice
had resulted.
In Rideau a conviction for robbery, kidnapping, and murder was
reversed because a motion for change of venue had been denied.
Two months prior to the trial the local television station had broad-
cast three times in a space of two days a twenty-minute filmed
confession made by the defendant to the parish sheriff in which
the defendant admitted that he had perpetrated the crimes of which
he was later charged.
The Court held that the filmed "interview," seen by thousands
of people in the community in which the defendant faced trial, was
antithetical to traditional concepts of due process; and that the tele-
vised confession was, in effect, a "trial" at which defendant pled
guilty to murder. Any further court proceedings in that commun-
ity could be but a hollow formality.43
In Turner a murder conviction was reversed where two deputy
sheriffs who were the principal prosecution witnesses also per-
formed the function of bailiff during a three day murder trial. This
duty resulted in their continuous and intimate association with the
jurors. No prejudice was shown, but the circumstances were held
to be inherently suspect and, therefore, such a showing was not held
to be a requisite of reversal.44 The Court was not impressed with
40. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
41. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
42. 379 U.S. 466 (1965).
43. [W] e hold that it was a denial of due process of law to refuse
the request for a change of venue, after the people of
Calcasieu Parish had been exposed repeatedly and in depth
to the spectacle of Rideau personally confessing in detail to
the crimes with which he was later to be charged. For any-
one who has ever watched television the conclusion cannot be
avoided that this spectacle, to the tens of thousands of people
who saw and heard it, in a very real sense was Rideau's trial
-at which he plead guilty to murder. Any subsequent Court
proceedings in a community so pervasively exposed to such
a spectacle could be but a hollow formality.
373 U.S. at 726.
44. Mr. Justice Holmes stated no more than a truism when he ob-
served that "Any judge who has sat with juries knows that
in spite of forms they are extremely likely to be impregnated
by the environing atmosphere."
379 U.S. at 472, quoting from Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 349
(1914) (dissenting opinion).
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testimony that the deputies had not discussed the case directly with
any member of the jury, recognizing the extreme prejudice in-
herent in the continued association throughout a trial between the
jurors and key witnesses for the prosecution.
Finally, Dr. Samuel Sheppard was granted relief on his applica-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus in Sheppard v. Maxwel 45 because
of the "Roman Holiday" atmosphere created by prejudicial public-
ity, both pretrial and contemporaneous with trial. From the outset,
news reports and headlines stressed the defendant's lack of coopera-
tion. A coroner's inquest was staged "live" in a school gymnasium.
Pretrial publicity emphasized evidence that tended to incriminate
the defendant and pointed out discrepancies in his statements. The
jury was not sequestered until the case was submitted to it for
deliberation; and much of the material printed or broadcast during
the trial, to which the jury had access, was never heard from the
witness stand. This deluge of publicity reached at least some mem-
bers of the jury. No effort was made by the court to control tele-
phone access to the jury. Media representatives were permitted
inside the railing of the courtroom separating the trial participants
from the spectator area, handled and photographed exhibits on the
counsel table and generally disrupted the proceedings to the point
of chaos. This case is an embarrassment both to the legal profes-
sion and to journalists.4 6 A responsible press was credited with
being the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, guarding
against miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors,
and the judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
The Court set forth several alternatives 47 which it deemed available
to the trial judge in Sheppard and which would have been deemed
sufficient to insure Sheppard's right to a fair trial. While it did
not sanction the use of a prior restraint on publication in that case,
Sheppard cannot be made to stand for the proposition that the al-
ternatives suggested were exhaustive and adequate for any con-
ceivable situation. The Court simply stated that the alternatives
which it suggested would have been sufficient to guarantee Shep-
pard a fair trial, and it expressly declined to consider what sanc-
tions might be available against a recalcitrant press. 48
III. ABSOLUTISM AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Certainly the overwhelming importance of a free press and the
45. 384U.S. 333 (1966).
46. The embarrassment to the legal profession was compounded by the
fact that the prosecutor was running for municipal judge at the time
and the trial judge was up for re-election. Id. at 342.
47. These alternatives are analyzed at pages 567-70 of this article as they
relate to State v. Simants.
48. 384 U.S. at 358.
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dangers inherent in restricting that freedom in a democratic society
cannot be overstated. It long has been held that freedom of discus-
sion should be given the widest range compatible with the essential
requirement of the fair and orderly administration of justice.49
However, as was observed by Justice Black in his dissenting opinion
in Cox v. Louisiana,5" notwithstanding the importance of a free
press, that freedom should not be permitted to divert a trial from
its very purpose of adjudicating controversies in the calmness and
solemnity of the courtroom according to legal procedures. One
of the most important of those legal procedures to a criminal de-
fendant is the requirement that the jury's verdict be based on
evidence received in open court, and not from outside sources. It
was observed in Marshall v. United States5 that prejudice through
news accounts may be even greater than prejudice resulting from
the prosecution's evidence, because the news accounts are not tem-
pered by judicial procedures.
The press took the position in the Simants case that the first
amendment is absolute, automatically bringing into subservience
every other provision of the Constitution. Indeed, the press posi-
tion denied the very existence of a conflict between the first amend-
ment guarantee of freedom of the press and the sixth amendment
guarantee to a criminal defendant of a fair trial before an impartial
jury.
Clearly a conflict exists in an exceptional, sensational, highly
publicized case such as the Simants murder trial. However, the
question is not whether a conflict exists, but, rather, whether there
are always adequate alternatives to the temporary restriction of
prejudicial publicity.
The claim of first amendment absolutism should be examined
briefly in historical perspective. It should be noted at the outset
that it is the sixth amendment and not the first which is couched
in absolute terms. The legislature is expressly prohibited from
passing any laws abridging freedom of the press and freedom of
speech. The executive and judicial branches of government are
omitted from this absolute prohibition. When examining prior re-
straint as it applies to the executive branch in protecting the na-
tional security and the judicial branch in securing the fair adminis-
tration of justice, a somewhat more flexible approach logically may
be taken. It is readily apparent that each of the latter branches
of government lacks the legislative capacity to institute a pervasive
system of censorship.52
49. See Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 347 (1946).
50. 379 U.S. 559, 583 (1965).
51. 360 U:. 310, 313 (1959).
52. This statement is not to be taken as endorsing unwarranted restric-
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The Supreme Court in Near v. Minnesota" specifically recog-
nized that liberty of speech and of press are not absolute rights.
The Court has long recognized exceptions to the rule against prior
restraints in the area of national security, Schenck v. United
States;5 4 obscenity, Freedman v. Maryland;5 5 and "the insulting or
'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury
or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace," Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire.5 6 The national security exception articulated in
Schenck was most recently reviewed in New York Times Co. v.
United States57 where seven members of the Court recognized the
validity of the Schenck exception to the presumption against re-
straints although the majority held that the prior restraint against
publication there involved was invalid.
Freedman and Chaplintky may be recognized as legitimate ex-
ceptions to the general prohibition against prior restraints although
they are based on a different footing than is the Schenck exception.
What was banned in Chaplinsky and what might have been banned
in Freedman had constitutional procedures been followed was
speech qua speech. In Roth v. United States58 the Supreme Court
held that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally pro-
tected speech or press. The same, of course, holds true for the
"fighting words" prohibited by Chaplinsky.
Likewise, "commercial speech" may, under certain circum-
stances, overcome the constitutional presumption of invalidity of
prior restraints.59 Constitutional protection is also not afforded to
libelous or defamatory comment.60
The validity of other restrictions involving prior restraints on
the press or on speech has been recognized in the area of copyright
law. Since the founding of the Republic, we have had copyright
laws authorizing the courts to grant injunctions against publica-
tion.6 1 Cases involving injunctions under the copyright law have
been frequent in federal courts62 and even the press has not been
tions on publication and broadcasting by the executive and judicial
branches of government. The Watergate experience clearly demon-
strates the importance of a free press.
53. 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931).
54. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
55. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
56. 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
57. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
58. 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
59. Pittsburg Press Co. v. Pittsburg Comn'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376 (1973).
60. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
61. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1970).
62. Cf. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834); Folsom v. March,
9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4901) (C.CD. Mass. 1841).
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averse to the prior restraint involved in an injunction in such
cases.6 3
The Supreme Court also has sustained the validity of an injunc-
tion involving a prior restraint on an employee of the CIA who had
signed an agreement not to make disclsoures and who was threaten-
ing to publish material without the approval required by that
agreement.64
Cease-and-desist orders have escaped constitutional defect when
issued to secure enforcement of federal regulatory statutes. 65 In
Sinclair v. NLRB, 66 the Supreme Court upheld the National Labor
Relations Board's setting aside of a representative election because
of coercive communications by the employer to its employees during
an election campaign, notwithstanding Sinclair's first amendment
challenge. The Court unanimously upheld the Board's order re-
quiring Sinclair to cease-and-desist from "threatening the employ-
ees with the possible closing of the plant or the transfer of the
weaving production, with the attendant loss of employment, or with
any other economic reprisals, on the basis of their selection of any
labor organization as their collective-bargaining representative.167
In its opinion in Sinclair, the Court specifically recognized that the
freedom of speech granted to the employer is subject to the limited
restriction necessary to protect "the equal rights of the employees
to associate freely .... ,,68 The above authorities are cited only
to emphasize that an absolutist view of the first amendment cannot
be supported in history or in law.
IV. PRIOR RESTRAINTS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
It consistently has been held that the exercise of first amend-
ment rights is constitutionally protected only when done in a rea-
sonable and proper time, place, and manner.6 9 In this regard prior
63. See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
64. See Albert A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 421 U.S. 908 (1975); United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
65. See FTC v. Texaco Inc., 393 U.S. 223, 231 (1968), where the Supreme
Court ordered enforcement of an order of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion restraining Texaco from using devices such as dealer discussions,
in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
66. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), aff'g NLRB v. Sin-
clair Co., 397 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1968).
67. Id. at 589.
68. Id. at 617.
69. Archer, The Constitutional Fairness of Fair Trial-Free Press, 1976 (un-
published manuscript in office of Lincoln County Attorney, North
Platte, Nebraska); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 405 (1953); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
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restraints have been held to pass constitutional scrutiny to the ex-
tent that demonstrations, parades, and similar first amendment con-
duct require the obtaining of a permit beforehand; 7° provided that
the regulating legislation is not vague 71 and does not allow the offi-
cials granting the permits any degree of discretion violative of due
process.72
Focusing on first amendment activity directed at the judicial
process, Cox v. Louisiana73 reversed on due process grounds the
conviction of the leader of demonstrations under a statute prohibit-
ing parades or pickets in the proximity of a courthouse with the
intended effect of interference with the administration of justice.
However, in upholding the validity of the statute the Court stated
that "specific conduct that infringes a substantial state interest in
protecting the judicial process can be constitutionally prohibited." 74
It has been stated expressly that temporary restraints on the
press involving pending judicial actions may be employed in some
instances. Mr. Justice White in Branzburg v. Hayes75 stated that
newsmen "may be prohibited from attending or publishing informa-
tion about trials if such restrictions are necessary to insure a de-
fendant a fair trial before an impartial tribunal."
76
Restrictions on publication of prejudicial information would
seem to be more easily justified if limited to the period prior to
the impaneling and sequestering of a jury. Most of the cases which
previously reached the Supreme Court and which resulted in pro-
tection of the press from restrictions on what they may report are
concerned with the trial phase of the proceedings. At that stage
in the criminal proceeding the jurors and witnesses can be other-
wise shielded from prejudicial publicity.77 A restriction limited to
pretrial coverage may delay coverage but does not take on the form
of permanent censorship. Further, unless the threat to a fair ad-
ministration of criminal justice is both "substantial" and "immi-
nent" any delay should be deemed constitutionally impermissible.78
70. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941).
71. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938).
72. Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183-84 (1968).
73. 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
74. Id. at 564.
75. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
76. Id. at 685. See also Newspapers, Inc. v. Blackwell, 421 U.S. 997 (1975);
Times-Picayune Publishing Corp. v. Schulingkamp, 419 U.S. 1301, 1307
(1974).
77. See, e.g., Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida,
328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
78. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941).
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The distinction between jury and nonjury cases was expressly
recognized in Wood v. Georgia"9 where a public official criticized
the judge who initiated a grand jury investigation into alleged po-
litical corruption in a press conference specifically covering the sub-
ject of the grand jury investigation. In reversing the conviction
for contempt the court observed that "this case does not represent
a situation where an individual is on trial.
8 0
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart did not involve news comment
upon a public official or the judicial system. The Supreme Court
consistently has held that judges are not immune from criticism
in their judicial capacity.8 ' It has also held that the sixth amend-
ment guaranteeing a criminal defendant not only the right to
a public trial, but also to a fair trial by a panel of impartial
jurors. It is clear that when that right is subverted by preju-
dicial publicity in violation of due process requirements applicable
to the states through the fourteenth amendment, the necessary re-
sult is frustration of the judicial process necessitating a new trial.8 2
As noted in Sheppard v. Maxwell, "we must remember that re-
versals are mere palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial meas-
ures which will prevent the prejudice at its inception."8 3
V. TEMPORARY RESTRAINT V. PUBLIC ACCESS
The essential conflict presented to the Supreme Court in Ne-
braska Press Ass'n v. Stuart was between two vitally important
concepts: (1) that the right of the courts to conduct their business
unimpeded lies at the foundation of our system of government8 4
and (2) that the news media have the right to report what trans-
pires in the courtroom.8 5
Although temporary restraint on publication of events transpir-
ing in judicial proceedings open to the public has never been af-
forded constitutional sanction, the admonition in Sheppard re-
quiring the courts to take measures to avoid the effects of prejudi-
cial publicity where there is a reasonable likelihood that it will pre-
vent a fair trial remains as a constant reminder to the legal profes-
sion and journalists that irresponsible conduct will not be toler-
ated.86
79. 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
80. Id. at 387.
81. See cases cited in note 77 supra.
82. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717
(1961).
83. 384 U.S. at 365.
84. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 383 (1962).
85. See Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947).
86. 384 U.S. at 362-63.
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Both Craig and Sheppard focused upon the trial stage of the ju-
dicial proceeding. The statement of Justice Douglas in Craig is
based on the premise that "a trial is a public event." Of course,
the concern in Sheppard was the "Roman Holiday" atmosphere sur-
rounding the trial itself. The order of the Nebraska Supreme Court
subjected to constitutional scrutiny applied only to pre-trial hear-
ings, some of which could have been waived by the defendant. The
difficulty arose from the fact that the order applied to hearings in
open court. The most notable proceeding to which it applied was
the preliminary hearing held on October 22, 1975, at which the State
was required to present sufficient evidence to justify binding over
the defendant to the district court for trial.
A Nebraska statute requires that a criminal defendant who is
unable to make bond or is held without bond shall be offered a
preliminary hearing within four days of his arrest.87
The right to a preliminary hearing is a right belonging to the
accused. He may waive the hearing should he desire. However,
if it is impossible to restrict prejudicial coverage, the criminal de-
fendant may prejudice his right to a fair trial by exercising his right
to a preliminary hearing. This is especially true, when, as in the
Simants case, the testimony to be adduced by the State included
not one but three damaging statements against interest.
From the standpoint of society, the resultant pervasive publicity
arising from the introduction of confessions in a sensational case
may have the attendant effect of frustrating effective prosecution.
That danger is especially significant in Nebraska where a change
of venue in criminal actions is limited to removal to counties ad-
joining the county in which the crime was committed.8 8 The coun-
ties adjoining Lincoln County, Nebraska, are served by essentially
the same newspapers and broadcast stations as Lincoln County. The
crime involved the largest scale mass murder in Nebraska since
the Charles Starkweather killings of 1959. The matter, therefore,
attained a level of great importance to the people of Lincoln County
and to surrounding communities.
The media relied heavily on the concept of immunity from prior
restraint based on the supposed voluntary revelation by the prose-
cution of the existence of confessions at the preliminary hearing
of the defendant, Simants. The first point which must be made
is that a Nebraska statute requires that all judicial proceedings be
open to the public unless otherwise provided. 89 The constitutional-
87. NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-501 (Reissue 1975).
88. NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-1301 (Reissue 1975).
b9. NEB. REv. STAT. § 24-311 (Reissue 1975).
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ity of this statute was not challenged and the prosecution success-
fully opposed all motions of the defendant to close the proceedings.
It would seem to be far more desirable from the vantage point of
the people's "right to know" to permit the press to be present at
all proceedings even if, in exceptional circumstances, publication of
certain highly prejudicial information is restricted until the jury
is impaneled and may be protected from outside influences. The
argument that it is a denial of equal protection to apply the order
only to members of the media and not to members of the public
attending the hearings defies logic and practical experience. The
impact of media coverage through the use of commercial air waves
and mass dissemination of printed material is infinitely greater
than discussions with friends and relatives initiated by those mem-
bers of the public in attendance at the proceeding.
The concern that rumor and innuendo in communities victimized
by sensational crime can more greatly prejudice the sixth amend-
ment right to a fair trial than impartial reporting of the facts is
likewise without merit. The average citizen gives much greater
credence to the printed word than to hearsay information received
from acquaintances. This is particularly true with regard to re-
ports of judicial proceedings. There is added danger in reporting
prejudicial testimony from a preliminary hearing in that the only
purpose served by the hearing is a determination of probable cause
to require a criminal defendant to undergo trial. When confessions
are introduced, the question of voluntariness is not before the court
for determination. In the Simants case, all of the physical evidence
which would be used at trial to corroborate the State's case was
being prepared for shipment to the criminal laboratory of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation in Washington, D.C., for analysis, at
the time of the preliminary hearing. The only evidence in the
State's possession at the time of the preliminary hearing linking
the defendant to the crime, was his confessions to his nephew, his
parents, and law enforcement officials. In the absence of the intro-
duction of the defendant's incriminating statements, the State
would have been unable to bind over the defendant to district court
for trial. It cannot be contended that the prosecution "voluntarily"
disclosed for public dissemination confessions of a defendant which
were necessarily revealed in proceedings statutorily required to be
open to the public.
Confessions lend themselves uniquely to pretrial restraint
against publication. It may be argued that it is desirable for the
public to be informed of alleged confessions because (1) press re-
ports may reveal that the confession was improperly coerced and
(2) the confession itself may implicate other persons whom the
prosecutor may, for improper reasons, otherwise fail to prosecute.
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With regard to the revelation of a coerced confession, it is submitted
that the voluntariness of a confession is, in the first instance, a
question for judicial determination, not editorial comment.
As indicated above, the admissibility of a confession is not before
the court for determination at the time of the preliminary hearing.
At that stage in the proceedings, after the perpetration of a crime
has been established, the mere fact of the existence of a confession
establishes "probable cause" to believe that the defendant com-
mitted the crime and to provide a basis for binding him over to
the district court for trial. In Jackson v. Denno10° the Supreme
Court determined that the question of the voluntariness of a confes-
sion is a matter of law for determination by the court and not a
question of fact for determination by the jury. The question for
jury determination is the truthfulness of the confession. In that
case the Court set forth the requirement that criminal defendants
are entitled to a hearing in state courts on the question of the vol-
untariness of a confession. Such a hearing is to take place outside
the presence of the jury and would be of little practical effect if
vast numbers of potential jurors had already been exposed to the
fact that a confession or confessions existed. The fact that Simants
confessed to his nephew, his parents, and law enforcement offi-
cials was published prior to the prosecution's request for an order
restricting publicity in the Simants case. The contents of the con-
fession to defendant's parents already had been related.
Perhaps the defendant should have waived his right to a pre-
liminary hearing. However, if he had done so, he may have been
precluded from raising, on appeal, the legal question of "probable
cause" for his arrest and detention. In the absence of an order re-
stricting prejudicial coverage, both the defendant and the prosecu-
tion would have been placed in untenable positions. The defendant
would have had to choose whether to protect the record for appeal
and the prosecution would have had to choose between the possibil-
ity of not adducing enough evidence to insure a bind over or that
of paving the way for a reversal because of prejudicial pretrial
publicity through introduction of additional evidence. Neither the
right of a criminal defendant to a preliminary hearing nor the right
of the state to effective enforcement of its laws should be impaired
by. prejudicial coverage of pretrial proceedings. The contention
that it is better that a guilty man go free than that the press
be limited grants to the press absolute freedom while denying any
responsibility. As indicated above, an absolutist position concern-
ing the first amendment guarantee of freedom of the press has
never been accepted. The press exists to provide the widest dissemi-
90. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
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nation of information possible to the people. In this respect, the
press as an institution is protected by the first amendment. This in-
stitution, however, exists to serve the people. Service requires re-
sponsibility, and the publication of information that may have the
effect of so influencing the fair administration of justice that a guil-
ty man would be freed, denies that responsibility.
VI. THE STANDARD TO BE APPLIED
Any action taken, including prior restraint, which produces a
chilling effect on the exercise of first amendment guarantees must
be carefully scrutinized. The action taken must be reasonable and
have the attendant effect of eliminating a "clear and present dan-
ger" to the administration of justice. The "substantive evil"
thought to be forestalled must be extremely serious and the degree
of "imminence" extremely high.91 The loss of a criminal defend-
ant's sixth amendment rights must certainly be considered a "sub-
stantive evil."9 2
A "clear and present danger" exists if prejudicial publicity im-
pairs the protection of sixth amendment rights possessed by a crim-
inal defendant. The importance of the "individual" is basic to our
democratic system. The concern of the Founding Fathers for the
individual was underscored by George Mason's refusal to support
ratification of the Constitution because it did not contain guaran-
tees of individual rights. Shortly after Mason's action, the Bill of
Rights was ratified, which insured that the central government
would not tamper with those rights basic to a free people. Apply-
ing the clear and present danger test, the case which bears the
closest analogy to the facts of Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart is
91. Mr. Justice Black, in Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941),
concluded: "What finally emerges from the 'clear and present danger'
cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be ex-
tremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high . .. ."
Bridges did not deal directly with prior restraints but rather with the
possibility of contempt citations being issued for publishing certain
matters. It is submitted that in determining the validity of any Court
action that impinges on the first amendment rights of the press, the
proper test to be applied should be the "clear and present danger"
test.
92. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328
U.S. 331, 353 (1946), declared:
"The clear and present danger" to be arrested may be danger
short of a threat as comprehensive and vague as a threat to
the safety of the Republic or 'the American Way of life.'..
Among "the substantive evils" with which legislation may
deal is the hampering of a court in a pending controversy, be-
cause the fair administration of justice is one of the chief tests
of a true democracy."
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Rideau v. Louisiana,93 discussed above, in which a conviction was
reversed because a motion for change of venue was denied after
a confession of the defendant had been televised three times in the
space of two days by a local station. Rideau had given a televised
confession to the parish sheriff and that confession was televised
to the community in which the trial ultimately was held. Simants
had confessed to his nephew, his parents, and had given a tape-
recorded confession to law enforcement officials. Simants was ar-
rested on Saturday, October 19, 1975, and on the following Monday,
reports of the contents of confessions to the nephew and parents
were publicized together with the fact that Simants made a state-
ment to law enforcement officials.
A distinguishing characteristic between the cases is that the Si*-
mants confessions were publicized prior to the time the court had
opportunity for admonishment from the bench regarding prejudi-
cial publicity. The community in which Rideau was tried had a
population of approximately 150,000 inhabitants. It was estimated
that audiences totaling 106,000 had witnessed the televised confes-
sion during its three twenty-minute segments over a period of two
days. Lincoln County, in which Simants was tried, has approxi-
mately 32,000 total population of which approximately 22,000 reside
in the city of North Platte, the county seat. The local radio and
television stations reach all counties to which venue could have
been changed. The North Platte Telegraph has a circulation of
17,000, most of which is in Lincoln County and counties immedi-
ately adjacent to Lincoln County.
In Rideau the conviction was reversed because of in-depth ex-
posure of the community to the spectacle of the defendant per-
sonally confessing in detail to the crimes of which he was charged.
In Simants' case, in-depth exposure of the community to confes-
sions of the defendant was forestalled by the protective order, lim-
ited in scope and duration, as ultimately entered by the Nebraska
Supreme Court. The latter part of the state court's order, preclud-
ing dissemination of "other information strongly implicative of the
accused as the perpetrator of the slayings," was attacked as vague
and all-encompassing. The Supreme Court in Nebraska Press Ass'n
v. Stuart agreed. It is submitted that while the admonition may
appear vague in the abstract, its meaning is clarified when applied
to the factual circumstances of a given case.
The threat posed by highly prejudicial pretrial publicity in Si-
mants' case was both "substantial" and "imminent." The trial court
was acutely aware of the situation concerning publicity, reactions
93. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
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of the community, and the gravity and the brutality of the crime.
The trial court found .that a "clear and present danger" existed,
threatening the sixth amendment right of Simants to a fair trial.
Therefore, an accommodation had to be made between his rights
and the rights of the press under the first amendment. The media
suggested that the first and sixth amendment have enjoyed a har-
monious relationship since the founding of our country. Sheppard,
Estes, Rideau, and other cases 94 clearly establish the invalidity
of such an argument in this modern world of massive and instan-
taneous dissemination of news. Where a "clear and present danger"
exists to the impaneling of an impartial jury, the prospective injury
to the rights and interests of the criminal defendant and society
must be balanced against the prospective injury to the rights and
interests of the press.
Certainly freedom of the press is vitally important to a demo-
cratic society and only in rare circumstances should limits be placed
on the news media.95 It is precisely in those limited and rare cases
where a "clear and present danger" exists that the press should be
circumscribed temporarily from reporting that which takes place
in open court at pretrial hearings. However, such orders should
be strictly limited to the exceptional, highly publicized, sensational
case and should be tailored to the specific circumstances, limited
in scope and duration.96 This position is not undermined by the
decision in Times-Picayune Publishing Corp. v. Schulingkamp97
which resulted in the stay of a restriction on publication in a clearly
distinguishable case.
VII. ALTERNATIVES TO A PRIOR RESTRAINT
Some contend that Sheppard v. Maxwell stands for the proposi-
tion that a prior restraint on publication may never issue because
that case set forth sufficient reasonable alternatives to be used by
the judiciary under any conceivable circumstance. Therefore, the
alternatives suggested in that case should be analyzed in relation-
ship to Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart.
94. Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959) (per curiam); Shepherd
v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951) (per curiam).
95. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Pennekamp, stated: "Without a free
press there can be no free society. Freedom of the press, however,
is not an end in itself but a means to the end of a free society." 328
U.S. at 354-55 (footnotes omitted).
96. See ABA LEG. ADVISORY Comm. oN FAIR TIAL AND FREE PRESS, PRE-
LIMINARY DRAFT PRoposED COURT PRocEDuRE FOR FAIR TRIAL-FREE PRESS
JUDICIAL REsrnCrTVE ORDERS (1975).
97. 419 U.S. 1301 (1974).
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Alternatives suggested in Sheppard included continuance of the
trial date, change of venue, admonishments to the jury, extensive
voir dire of prospective jurors, reversal or new trial. None of
these alternatives would have solved the problems raised by the
Simants case.
The suggestion of a continuance of the trial date does not ac-
knowledge the criminal defendant's constitutional right to a speedy
trial and the prosecution's statutory obligation to bring the matter
to trial within six months.98 Further, Nebraska requires that the
trial of a criminal case be given preference over civil cases, and that
the trial of a defendant who is in custody and whose pretrial lib-
erty is reasonably thought to present unusual risks must be given
preference over other criminal cases.9 9 The defendant, Simants,
was held without bail. Recognizing these constitutional and statu-
tory obligations, the trial judge set a January 5, 1976, trial date.
Because of the necessity of an early trial date and in view of the
great interest expressed in this case both regionally and nationally,
the position that adverse effects of pretrial publicity could have
been substantially reduced by continuance lengthening the cooling
off period between arrest and trial is untenable.
The logical question is whether it would not have been possible
that the passage of time before the trial would have destroyed much
of the prejudicial effect of pretrial publicity even in the absence
of a continuance. A cursory review of local news coverage reveals
that scarcely a single day passed between the occurrence of the
crime and the conclusion of the trial in which there was not a report
of the progress of the action in the North Platte Telegraph. As
indicated earlier, this newspaper is the paper of general circulation
throughout Lincoln County and surrounding communities. The
crime, certainly newsworthy and publicized each day, did not lessen
in importance as time went by, but rather became of greater im-
portance to the people in the community.
Similarly, a motion for change of venue would not' have been
a practical alternative. Nebraska law'00 permits change of venue
in criminal cases only to a county adjoining the county in which
the crime was committed. The defendant, Simants, did, in fact,
move for a change of venue, and this motion was opposed by the
prosecution on the bases that limitations on pretrial coverage had
been effective, and that if defendant's right to a fair trial had
been prejudiced in Lincoln County, a change of venue to an
adjoining county would not remedy the problem. All adjoining
98. See NzB. REv. STAT. § 29-1207 (Reissue 1975).
99. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1205 (Reissue 1975).
100. NEB. Rsv. STAT. § 29-1301 (Reissue 1975).
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counties are smaller than Lincoln County and are served by many
of the same television and radio stations, newspapers, and wire
services. It should be observed that the parties involved in Ne-
braska Press Ass'n v. Stuart included the Omaha World Herald Co.,
which publishes a newspaper of general circulation for the entire
state of Nebraska; United Press International, and Associated
Press, both national organizations for the dissemination of news;
and the Nebraska Broadcasting Association, the state organization
of broadcasters. The pretrial publicity which this case received
was not localized in Lincoln County but pervaded the entire state
of Nebraska.
Instructions from the court that the jury disregard prejudicial
information which had come to them from outside sources is an-
other alternative which was impractical. As has been shown cir-
cumstances surrounding a criminal proceeding can give rise to such
a prejudicial atmosphere that due process is inherently lacking. No
matter how hard a juror tries consciously to set aside an opinion
which he has established, subconscious impartiality may be unob-
tainable. Instructions are effective only if given to a jury which
was not seated with an established predisposition toward guilt or
innocence.
Extensive voir dire examination to determine the existence of
prejudices and to eliminate those veniremen who hold an estab-
lished predisposition with regard to this particular criminal defend-
ant was also impractical. As the Supreme Court had noted, an en-
tire community can be fatally infected from extensive prejudicial
publicity 0 1 or from circumstances such as those in Rideau where
the defendant's televised confession was shown repeatedly and in
depth two months prior to trial; or from the televising of pretrial
proceedings and parts of the trial itself as in Estes. The Court has
recognized that pretrial publicity can create a major problem for
a criminal defendant and has refused to sanction television coverage
of trials as a valid exercise of first amendment freedoms.
These cases recognize that what a juror says on voir dire does
not insure impartiality. The criterion is far from satisfactory and
its application is unclear. For instance, Murphy v. Florida,10 2 in-
volved a case where "scores of articles," "bizarre media coverage"
and a juror who not only had knowledge of defendant's prior con-
victions but who "imagined" these convictions would influence the
verdict. Certainly he came into the case with something less than
a presumption of innocence for the defendant. Yet the Court by
a majority of 7 to 1 held that fourteenth amendment due process
101. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S.
717 (1961).
102. 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
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had not been violated. The juror's bias was not considered signifi-
cant because it was brought out by "leading and hypothetical ques-
tions."103
It is apparent that the more times a potential juror is asked
whether he has heard of confessions, statements, or accounts of the
defendant's prior criminal record, the more the existence of this
prejudicial information is driven home. If the attorneys are less
direct in their examination of potential jurors, they may not un-
cover an existing bias. Pervasive and prejudicial publicity sur-
rounding trials of unpopular defendants substantially enhances the
problem.
At best, voir dire is an elimination, not a selection process. Biases
are sought through extensive inquiry and if the bias cannot be neu-
tralized the venireman should be excused. Discovery of bias may
be rendered impossible regarding some veniremen who will con-
sciously or unconsciously hide their bias. 0 4
Professors Padawar-Singer and Barton found that jurors ex-
posed to prejudicial coverage "were as much as 66% more likely
to find defendants 'guilty' than jurors who had read 'straight' news
reporting." The preliminary study also found that thorough voir
dire examination reduced this- figure but did not by any means
eliminate it.105
The projected alternatives of reversals or new trials cannot be
properly considered as alternatives to a trial judge. They exist only
to insure that the pretrial publicity was not unduly prejudicial to
a criminal defendant. The trial judge must enter whatever orders
are necessary to secure a criminal defendant his right to a fair trial
by an impartial jury. A judge who would refuse to enter a protec-
tive order in a necessary case because any prejudices arising from
pretrial publicity could presumably be corrected on appeal would
abuse his discretion and the appellate judicial process. i°6 The sup-
posed remedies of sequestration of witnesses, juries, and admoni-
103. See id. at 804 (Brennan, 3., dissenting).
104. The most dangerous are those who have a preconceived opinion, and
who will use deceit in order to serve on a jury so as to execute that
opinion, the number being in direct proportion to the intensity of
pretrial publicity. See Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical
Study, 38 S. CAL. L. Rzv. 503 (1965).
105. Archer, supra note 69.
106. Is it a satisfactory resolution of the problem to protect "the
poisoner" in plying his trade, but-because the first trial was
"posoned"-put the state to the trouble and expense of a sec-
ond trial years after the event, and subject the accused to the
ordeal of a second trial-which again may be "poisoned"?
L. HALL, Y. KAmAsAR, W. LAFAvE & J. IsRAEL, MODERN CsnsnuAL PRO-
cmuRE 1145 (3d ed. 1969).
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tions to disregard media coverage are directed to the conduct of the
trial itself and can have no effect on prejudicial pretrial publicity.
The discussion above encompasses each of the alternatives sug-
gested in Sheppard as an alternative to protective orders. The al-
ternatives suggested, though ordinarily adequate, do not extend to
every conceivable situation and certainly would have been inade-
quate with respect to the Simants case. In the sensational, excep-
tional, highly publicized case there may be no adequate alternative
to a temporary restraint on publication of prejudicial facts.10 7
VIII. CONCLUSION
The question of pretrial publicity should not be relegated to
emotionalism. The use of terms such as "gag" hide the problem
in an aura of emotion. No suggestion is made that the first amend-
ment should be the sacrificial lamb of the sixth amendment. Rather,
the issue is one of sovereignty in the judicial system. It has been
suggested that exposure of the judicial process to injury in excep-
tional, highly publicized, sensational cases is the price which must
be paid by society for the privilege of enjoying a free press. This
position is not acceptable in that the injury in such case is to society
as a whole, which, due to the impossibility of a criminal defendant
obtaining a fair trial, must necessarily forego a conviction of a per-
son who may well have committed the crime for which he is
charged.
The importance of severely limiting any infringement of the ex-
ercise of a free press to exceptional cases cannot be overempha-
sized. Certainly, in balancing the interests of the fair administra-
tion of justice as against the exercise of a free press, borderline
cases should be resolved in favor of the first amendment. This is
true because of the various alternatives available to trial judges in
protecting the criminal defendant's right to fair trial. However, the
alternatives to a prior restraint simply are not feasible in every cir-
cumstance. The Simants case provided a classic example justifying
prior restraints on publication during the pretrial period. The
Bridges requirements that the "substantive evil" be extremely seri-
ous and the degree of "imminence" extremely high were clearly met
as they related to the impaneling of an impartial jury. This is es-
107. The limited period of the restraint in this case finds an analogy in
United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971), where
the Supreme Court found that a restraint of 74 days was not unconsti-
tutionally excessive. It is true that obscenity is not within the scope
of first amendment protection. But when the issue is whether the
item is or is not obscene, some of the items may constitute protected
expression. A restraint on their publication for the limited period nec-
essary to decide the issue was upheld, though an unlimited restraint
would have been invalid.
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pecially true in light of the statutory inability of the Nebraska trial
judge to transfer the case beyond the reaches of the prejudicial pub-
licity. There did not exist in Simants the "Roman Holiday" or
"Carnival Atmosphere" that was prevalent during the Sheppard
trial or the theatrical environment of thet Estes and Rideau trials.
However, in light of the attitudes of the community, the publication
of the existence and contents of alleged confessions made by Si-
mants, and the magnitude of the crime which focused statewide at-
tention on a small rural community, the finding of a "clear and
present danger" to the administration of criminal justice was war-
ranted.
An issue not yet examined, but which certainly underlies the
question of prejudicial pretrial publicity, is the effect of such pub-
licity on the prosecution's burden of proof. It is incumbent upon
the prosecution in our system of judicial administration to prove
the allegations against a criminal defendant beyond a reasonable
doubt. The prejudices created in the minds of the citizens of a
community in which a sensational case arises would seem to have
the practical effect of reducing that burden. The corresponding ef-
fect is to place upon the criminal defendant the burden of estab-
lishing his innocence. Such a result cannot be tolerated under our
constitutional system of government.
A narrow limitation on the press, confined to the shortest fixed
period compatible with sound judicial determination, is a moderate
price to pay for the preservation of justice and public confidence
in the judicial system. Freedom of the press must not be permitted
to divert a trial from its purpose of adjudicating controversies in
an atmosphere compatible with due process considerations and ac-
cording to established judicial procedures. Paramount of such pro-
cedures is that jury verdicts should be based upon the evidence
received in open court and not on outside sources. The essential
liberties encompassed by the first and sixth amendments can be
protected only in a case by case determination. What is needed is
expeditious review of any judicial order entered to insure that any
unconstitutional limitation on the press may be promptly reviewed
and reversed. It is incumbent upon the legal profession to recog-
nize that restraints should be imposed in only isolated incidents
involving a "clear and present danger" to the impaneling of a fair
and impartial jury. It is difficult to conceive of a situation arising
outside the setting of a potential jury trial in which a prior restraint
would be justifiable. We may correctly presume that those indi-
viduals entrusted with the responsibilities of the judiciary are suf-
ficiently strong-minded to be able to administer justice regardless
of news accounts and editorial comment upon questions requiring
their decisions alone.
